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i
QUESTIONS PRESENTED
(1) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state
to license a marriage between two people of the
same sex?
(2) Does the Fourteenth Amendment require a state
to recognize a marriage between two people of
the same sex when their marriage was lawfully
licensed and performed out-of-state?
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1
INTERESTS OF AMICI CURIAE1
Amici are scholars of family law and the law of
equal protection. Amici submit this brief to: (1) draw
attention to this Court’s precedent unequivocally establishing that states may not punish children based on
matters beyond their control and (2) demonstrate
that state marriage bans inevitably and necessarily
perform exactly this impermissible function because
they deprive children of same-sex couples legal, economic and social benefits associated with the institution of marriage. Thus, amici’s analysis, focusing on
the equal protection rights of children, provides an
independent basis for evaluating the constitutionality
of the state marriage bans. Further, amici’s analysis
is directly responsive to the states’ proffered justifications for their respective marriage bans.
------------------------------------------------------------------

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
“[I]mposing disabilities on the . . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that

1

This brief was not authored, in whole or in part, by counsel for either party, and no person other than amici and their
academic institutions contributed monetarily to the preparation
or submission of this brief. This amicus brief is filed pursuant to
a letter of consent from Petitioners’ counsel in all four cases.
Respondents have filed blanket consents on the docket in all
four cases.

2
legal burdens should bear some relationship
to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.”2
The Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a
direction that all persons similarly situated should
3
be treated alike.” And yet state marriage bans and
non-recognition bans (hereinafter “marriage bans”)
patently violate this most fundamental understanding of the equal protection guarantee. The children of
same-sex couples are identically situated to the children of opposite-sex couples in terms of their need
for and entitlement to the family-supporting rights
and benefits provided by the institution of marriage.
By providing these benefits to one group of children
while denying them to another, state marriage bans
impose permanent class distinctions between these
two groups of children, in essence penalizing the children of same-sex couples merely because their parents are of the same sex.
In a powerful body of precedent, this Court has
issued a clear prohibition against these types of laws.
Specifically, this Court has made clear that states
may not punish children by denying them governmentconferred benefits,4 based on matters beyond their
2

Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 220 (1982) (quoting Weber v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)) (alteration in original).
3
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, 473 U.S. 432,
439 (1985).
4
Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 72 (1968) (holding state
law that denied recovery to non-marital child for the wrongful
death of the child’s mother violated equal protection).

3
control, such as moral disapproval of their parents’
relationship, or in an effort to affect adult conduct.5
State marriage bans perform precisely this impermissible function. As demonstrated below, state marriage
bans punish the children of same-sex couples by denying them the legal, economic and social benefits
that flow from the institution of marriage, and they
do so based on concerns completely outside the child’s
control – for example, in an effort to incentivize adult
behavior – that is, “[e]ncourag[e] opposite-sex couples
to enter into a permanent, exclusive relationship.”6
Punishing children to express a preference for some
types of families over others, to reflect moral disapproval of same-sex relationships, to incentivize opposite-sex adult behavior, or to give effect to private biases
utterly severs the connection between legal burdens
and individual responsibility, a core tenet of equal
protection law.7 Thus, state marriage bans bespeak

5

Plyler, 457 U.S. at 219-20 (holding that arguments in support of withholding state benefits to undocumented entrants do not
apply to children of undocumented entrants because the children
cannot affect their parents’ conduct or their own status).
6
Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 37-38, DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at
*37 (“Encouraging opposite-sex couples to enter into a permanent, exclusive relationship with which to have and raise
children – into a marriage – is a legitimate state interest.”).
7
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 220 (“[I]mposing disabilities on the
. . . child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal
burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrongdoing.” (quoting Weber, 406 U.S. at 175)).

4
invidious discrimination rather than an effort to attain legitimate governmental objectives.8
------------------------------------------------------------------

ARGUMENT
This Court’s precedent dealing with the equal
protection rights of children unequivocally establishes
that states may not punish children for matters beyond their control.9 State marriage bans do precisely
this. They punish the children of same-sex couples
8

See Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (striking down state law denying workers’ compensation proceeds to non-marital children,
explaining “[t]he status of illegitimacy has expressed through
the ages society’s condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond
the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the
head of an infant is illegal and unjust.”); Plyler, 457 U.S. at 21920 (striking down Texas law that withheld state education funds
from school districts that enrolled children of Mexican descent
not legally admitted to the United States, in part, because
“children can neither affect their parents’ conduct nor their own
status”); Levy, 391 U.S. at 72 (“We conclude that it is invidious
to discriminate against [non-marital children] when no action,
conduct, or demeanor of theirs is possibly relevant to the harm
that was done the mother.”).
9
Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of SameSex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 1608 (2013) (explaining
how the government exclusion of children of same-sex couples is
“the modern-day equivalent” of the exclusion of non-marital children); Tanya Washington, In Windsor’s Wake: Section 2 of
DOMA’s Defense of Marriage at the Expense of Children, 48 IND.
L. REV. 1, 49-63 (2014) (describing the adverse impact of state
marriage bans and non-recognition laws on children in same-sex
families as violating children’s equal protection, substantive due
process and procedural due process rights).

5
because they: (1) foreclose their central legal route to
family formation; (2) categorically void their legal
parent-child relationships created incident to out-ofstate marriages; (3) deny them economic rights and
benefits; and (4) inflict psychological and stigmatic
harms.
I.

THIS COURT’S PRECEDENT UNEQUIVOCALLY ESTABLISHES THAT STATES MAY
NOT PUNISH CHILDREN BASED ON MATTERS BEYOND THEIR CONTROL

The Court’s equal protection jurisprudence has
expressed a consistent special concern for discrimination against children.10 Why? Because discrimination
against children always necessarily implicates two of
the Equal Protection Clause’s core values: promoting
a society in which one’s success or failure is the result
11
of individual merit, and discouraging the creation of

10

See Pickett v. Brown, 462 U.S. 1, 7 (1983) (noting explicitly
“a special concern for discrimination against non-marital children”); San Antonio Ind. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 111
(1973) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (stating that the Court has a
“special concern” with education because it is the “ ‘principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values,’ ” preparing
children for professional training, and helping children adjust to
the environment (quoting Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483,
493 (1954)).
11
See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 222; see also Susannah W. Pollvogt,
Unconstitutional Animus, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012)
(identifying meritocracy as core equal protection value).

6
permanent class or caste distinctions.12 Where laws
function to place children in a distinct, disadvantaged
class based on the conduct of their parents or other
adults, these principles are violated.13
Marriage bans contravene these important values. Indeed, the state defendants in these cases explicitly concede that marriage is good for children, yet
state marriage bans categorically exclude an entire
class of children – the children of same-sex couples –
from the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage that the states tout. In defending this differential treatment, the states make clear that marriage
bans are meant to express and enforce a bare preference for families headed by opposite-sex couples over
families headed by same-sex couples. Even if such a
bare preference for one social group over another
were a legitimate state interest (which it likely is
not), its inescapable corollary – a bare preference for
the children of opposite-sex couples over the children
of same-sex couples – cannot be deemed legitimate.

12

See Plyler, 457 U.S. at 234 (Blackmun, J., concurring);
see also Susannah W. Pollvogt, Unconstitutional Animus, 81
FORDHAM L. REV. 887, 926 (2012) (discussing goal of Equal
Protection Clause to eliminate laws that tend to create social
castes).
13
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175 (stating that condemning a child
for the actions of his parents is “illogical and unjust”); see Levy,
391 U.S. at 72 (holding that it is invidious to discriminate
against non-marital children for the actions of their parents over
which they have no control).

7
Thus, state marriage bans directly invoke this
Court’s special role in protecting children against
unfair discrimination – a role the Court has faithfully
fulfilled on multiple occasions.
A. Discrimination Against Non-Marital Children
This Court has consistently expressed special
concern with discrimination against children – in
particular protecting their right to self-determination
and to flourish fully in society without being hampered by legal, economic and social barriers imposed
by virtue of the circumstances of their birth.
This concern is perhaps most strongly expressed
in the Court’s treatment of non-marital children.14
The United States has a long history of discrimination against children born to unmarried parents.15
14

Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 505 (1976) (stating that
the status of non-marital children “is, like race or national origin, a characteristic determined by causes not within the control of the illegitimate individual”); Weber, 406 U.S. at 175; see
Levy, 391 U.S. at 72.
15
1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *447 (“[R]ights [of
a non-marital child] are very few, being only such as he can
acquire; for he can inherit nothing, being looked upon as the son
of nobody.”); Gareth W. Cook, Bastards, 47 TEX. L. REV. 326, 327
n.11 (1969); Harry D. Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. REV. 477, 498 (1967); but see Levy, 391 U.S. at
70 (“We start from the premise that illegitimate children are not
‘nonpersons.’ They are humans, live, and have their being. They
are clearly ‘persons’ within the meaning of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).

8
Because of society’s moral condemnation of their parents’ conduct, non-marital children were denied legal
and social benefits to which marital children were
entitled.16 They could not inherit property; further,
they were not entitled to financial parental support,
wrongful death recovery, workers’ compensation, social security payments, and other government benefits.17
In the early 1940s, criticism of the treatment of
non-marital children gained traction and eventually
became a part of the political and legal debates of the
civil rights movement.18 In 1968, Professor Harry
Krause and civil rights lawyer Norman Dorsen advanced child-centered arguments in Levy v. Louisiana,

16

Amici do not endorse any argument that the adult relationships or conduct (whether same-sex or opposite-sex) advanced by states to support state marriage bans are, in fact,
immoral, irresponsible, or a form of wrongdoing. Amici simply
argue that the state justifications that advance such arguments
cannot be deployed to punish children.
17
See Solangel Maldonado, Illegitimate Harm: Law, Stigma
and Discrimination Against Nonmarital Children, 63 FLA. L.
REV. 345, 346-47 (2011).
18
See JUSTINE WISE POLIER, ILLEGITIMACY AND THE LAW 13
(1944) (NOW Collection, Box 45, Folder 555, on file with the
Schlesinger Library, Radcliffe Institute, Harvard Univ.); Martha
Davis, Male Coverture: Law and the Illegitimate Family, 56
RUTGERS L. REV. 73, 90 (2003); Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589,
1608-15 (2013) (explaining the history of non-marital status
cases).

9
the first equal protection challenge on behalf of nonmarital children.19
The facts of the Levy case are compelling. Louise
Levy, an unmarried black mother with five young
children, died from the medical malpractice of a
state hospital.20 Born outside the bounds of marriage,
the Levy children were excluded by state law from
a “right to recover” for their mother’s death. Thelma
Levy, Louise’s sister, sued Louisiana on their behalf.21
The Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed the trial
court’s dismissal of the children’s claim on the
grounds that they were not “legitimate,” noting that
such a policy was justified because “ ‘morals and general welfare . . . discourage[ ] bringing children into
the world out of wedlock.’ ”22 In a groundbreaking
legal victory for children, this Court reversed. This
Court explained its departure from the practice of
deferring to legislative decisions, noting, “we have
19

Brief for Appellee, Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968)
(No. 508), 1968 WL 112826.
20
Levy, 391 U.S. at 70.
21
Id. In the same year as Levy, this Court decided a companion case, Glona v. Am. Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S.
73, 74-76 (1968), striking down a Louisiana law that denied a
mother wrongful death recovery for her deceased son because he
was born outside of marriage; but see Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S.
532, 539-40 (1971) (denying a non-marital child inheritance from
her father who died without a will).
22
Levy, 391 U.S. at 70 (quoting Levy v. Louisiana, 192 So. 2d
193, 195 (La. Ct. App. 1967)). The Louisiana Supreme Court denied certiorari because it found the Court of Appeals made no
error of law. Levy v. Louisiana, 250 La. 25 (1967).

10
been extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil
rights and have not hesitated to strike down an invidious classification even though it had history and
tradition on its side.”23 This Court determined Louisiana’s actions were a form of invidious discrimination
driven by the child’s status as “illegitimate” – a status
that was unrelated to the injury to the mother.24
Four years after Levy, in Weber v. Aetna Casualty
& Surety Co.,25 this Court struck another blow to
government conduct that penalized children based on
moral disdain of the parents’ conduct. In Weber,
Henry Clyde Stokes died of work-related injuries.
At the time of his death, he lived with Willie Mae
Weber.26 Stokes and Weber were not married, but
were raising five children together.27 One of the children was born to Stokes and Weber, while four others
had been born to Stokes and his lawful wife who had
previously been committed to a mental hospital.28
Weber and Stokes’ second child was born shortly after
Stokes’ death.29 The Louisiana Supreme Court upheld
a lower court decision disbursing workers’ compensation proceeds to the four marital children while

23
24
25
26
27
28
29

Levy, 391 U.S. at 71 (internal citations omitted).
Id. at 72.
406 U.S. 164 (1972).
Id. at 165.
Id.
Id.
Id.

11
denying such proceeds to the two non-marital children.30
Once again, this Court reversed and reiterated
that a state may not place its moral objection of a
child’s parents’ conduct at the feet of the child by
withholding government benefits. To do so places the
child at an economic disadvantage for conduct over
which the child has no control. This Court explained
that, while it could not prevent social disapproval of
children born outside of marriage, it could “strike
down discriminatory laws relating to the status of
birth.”31 This Court recognized that “[a]n unacknowledged illegitimate child may suffer as much from the
loss of a parent as a child born within wedlock or an
illegitimate later acknowledged.”32
From 1968 to 1986, the Supreme Court heard
more than a dozen cases challenging laws that disadvantaged non-marital children, before explicitly holding that this classification was of such concern that
differential treatment of non-marital children warranted intermediate scrutiny.33

30

Id. at 167-68.
Weber, 406 U.S. at 175-76.
32
Id. at 169.
33
See Clark v. Jeter, 486 U.S. 456, 465 (1988) (holding that
Pennsylvania statute was unconstitutional under intermediate
scrutiny).
31

12
B. Discrimination Against Children in Other
Contexts
This Court has also expressed special concern
about unfair discrimination against children in other
contexts. Specifically, Weber’s moral and jurisprudential clarity about discrimination against children was
echoed years later in Plyler v. Doe.34 At issue in Plyler
was a state law that sought to deny public education
to the children of undocumented immigrants. In deciding the case, this Court relied heavily on the
factual findings of the district court to the effect that:
(1) the law did nothing to improve the quality of
education in the state and (2) it instead tended to
“permanently lock[ ]” the children of undocumented
immigrants “into the lowest socio-economic class.”35
This Court highlighted the foundational mission
of the Equal Protection Clause: “to work nothing less
than the abolition of all caste-based and invidious
class-based legislation.”36 To be sure, not all laws that
distinguish between groups fall under this prohibition. But laws that determine the legal, economic and
social status of children based on the circumstances
of their birth surely do.
As this Court explained in Plyler, “[l]egislation
imposing special disabilities upon groups disfavored by
virtue of circumstances beyond their control suggests
34
35
36

457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 208.
Id. at 213.

13
the kind of ‘class or caste’ treatment that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to abolish.”37 The
Plyler Court went on to emphasize that, even though
it was arguably permissible to disapprove of the presence of undocumented immigrants in the United
States, it did not justify “imposing disabilities on
the minor children of ” undocumented immigrants.38
While “[t]heir parents have the ability to conform
their conduct to social norms,” the children “can affect
neither their parents’ conduct nor their own status.”39
This Court further explained, “[e]ven if the State
found it expedient to control the conduct of adults by
acting against their children, legislation directing the
onus of a parent’s misconduct against his children
does not comport with fundamental conceptions of
justice.”40 Thus, discrimination against children is unjust in part because it contravenes “one of the goals of
the Equal Protection Clause,” which is, “the abolition
of governmental barriers presenting unreasonable

37

Id. at 216 n.14 (emphasis added).
Id. at 219-20.
39
Id. at 220 (internal quotation marks omitted). Amici wish
to stress here that they do not believe that same-sex couples
should in any way be expected to “conform their conduct to
social norms” to the extent those norms prefer heterosexual
relationships. Rather, the point of Plyler and the other childcentered cases is that it is categorically impermissible to punish
children based on disapproval of their parents’ status or conduct.
40
Id.
38
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obstacles to advancement on the basis of individual
merit.”41
Levy, Weber, and Plyler establish that discrimination against children cannot be justified based on
moral disapproval of their parents’ marital or immigration status. Further, such discrimination cannot
be justified in an attempt to incentivize adults to
marry before having sex or to obtain proper immigration documentation.
Marriage bans violate these prohibitions. The
states recognize the legal, social and economic benefits of marriage, yet seek to deny them to children of
same-sex couples because of moral disagreement of
same-sex relationships, to enact a bare preference for
families headed by a man and a woman, and in an
attempt to incentivize opposite-sex couples to procreate responsibly within the bounds of marriage. The
states cannot impose such disabilities on minor children without running afoul of well-established equal
protection law.
C. The Impermissibility of Enforcing Private Biases Regarding “Ideal” Family
Structures
Another, related, impermissible justification for
governmental discrimination in any context is the
enforcement of private bias. In the seminal case of
41

Id. at 222.
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Palmore v. Sidoti,42 the Court took the unusual step of
reviewing a state family court’s custody award. Following divorce, the mother in the case was awarded
custody of the couple’s infant child. Both the father
and the mother were white. Subsequent to the divorce, the mother entered into a relationship with
and married a black man. The father sought custody
of the child based on these “changed conditions.”43 The
family court explicitly found that there was no issue
with either the mother’s or the stepfather’s parental
fitness.44 Nonetheless, the court took to heart the
recommendation of a counselor, who expressed concern about the “social consequences” for a child being
raised in “an interracial marriage.”45 Specifically, the
counselor opined: “[T]he wife [petitioner] has chosen
for herself and for her child, a life-style unacceptable
to the father and to society. . . . The child . . . is, or at
school age will be, subject to environmental pressures
not of choice.”46
On this basis, “the [family] court . . . concluded
that the best interests of the child would be served by
47
awarding custody to the father.” While acknowledging that the father’s disapproval of the relationship
42

466 U.S. 429 (1984).
Id. at 430.
44
Id.
45
Id.
46
Id. at 431 (emphasis added) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
47
Palmore, 466 U.S. at 431.
43
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was not a sufficient basis for awarding him custody,
the family court determined that, because society did
not yet fully accept interracial relationships, the child
would inevitably “suffer from . . . social stigmatization.”48
This Court acknowledged that the stated interest
in serving the best interests of the child was “a duty
49
of the highest order.” However, the Court’s chief concern was in regard to the actual function of the ruling, which gave legal effect to private bias.50 This
Court held that the family court’s decision, which
determined the best interests of the child based on
societal disapproval of the parents, violated equal
protection, famously stating: “Private biases may be
outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.”51
Here, marriage bans deny children the legal, economic and social benefits of marriage by giving effect
to private bias in two different ways. First, as detailed above, they give effect to private bias against
same-sex couples.52 Second, as discussed below, they
48

Id.
Id. at 433.
50
See id.
51
Id.
52
The bias reflected in the arguments against same-sex
marriage range from assumptions about the differences between
same-sex and opposite-sex couples, such as the biological distinctions in procreation make opposite-sex couples more suitable
parents, to extremely negative characterizations of gay men,
(Continued on following page)
49
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give effect to private bias based on undisguised
stereotypes about appropriate gender roles in parenting. It is well established that laws may not rely
on overbroad generalizations about the different
talents, capacities, or preferences of males and fe53
males. Assumptions about expected parenting roles
that men and women must or should perform based
on gender alone falls squarely within the gender
stereotyping that has been deemed impermissible in
equal protection law, including in decisions about
parental roles.
For example, in Caban v. Mohammed,54 the Court
struck down a New York law that permitted unwed
mothers to block the adoption of their children by
denying consent to potential adoptees, but did not
grant this consent-based objection to unwed fathers.55
lesbians and bisexuals. For example, in Ohio, marriage ban proponents explicitly supported their position by arguing that samesex relationships exposed the participants to “extreme risks of
sexually transmitted diseases, physical injuries, mental disorders and even a shortened life span.” Brief for PlaintiffsAppellees at 20, Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir.
2014) (No. 14-3057), 2014 WL 1745560, at *5.
53
See United States v. Virginia, 518 U.S. 515, 533 (1996);
see also Nevada Dept. of Human Resources v. Hibbs, 538 U.S.
721, 731 (2003) (recognizing “pervasive sex-role stereotype that
caring for family members is women’s work” as an insufficient
justification under Equal Protection Clause); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268, 279-80 (1979) (holding invalid justification based on
state’s preference for allocation of family responsibilities under
which wife plays a dependent role).
54
441 U.S. 380 (1979).
55
Id. at 384.
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The father challenged this gender-based distinction
as an equal protection violation.56 The mother argued
that the distinction between unwed mothers and unwed fathers was based on a fundamental difference
between the sexes, because “a natural mother, absent
special circumstances, bears a closer relationship
with her child” than a father.57 This Court disagreed,
finding that “maternal and paternal roles are not
invariably different in importance,” and even if unwed mothers were closer to their newborn children,
“this generalization concerning parent-child relations
would become less acceptable as the age of the child
increased.”58 The court “reject[ed] . . . the claim that
the broad, gender-based distinctions of [the statute] is
required by any universal difference between maternal and paternal relations at every phase of a child’s
development.”59
In sum, states may not punish children based on
the status of their birth, regardless of whether the
state’s aim is to express moral disapproval of adult
conduct, control or incentivize adult behavior, or give
effect to private bias about same-sex couples or
stereotypes about the parenting abilities of men and
women.

56
57
58
59

Id. at 385.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 389.
Id.
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II.

STATE MARRIAGE BANS HARM CHILDREN
OF SAME-SEX COUPLES BY DEPRIVING
THEM OF THE IMPORTANT LEGAL, ECONOMIC, AND SOCIAL BENEFITS OF
MARRIAGE WITHOUT JUSTIFICATION

As demonstrated above, this Court’s precedent
establishes that states may not punish children for
matters beyond their control. Matters beyond the
child’s control include moral disapproval of adult
conduct, efforts to control or incentivize adult behavior, or practices that give effect to private bias. State
marriage bans do precisely this.
A. State Marriage Bans Impose Legal, Economic and Social Harms on the Children of Same-Sex Couples
After this Court’s decision in United States v.
Windsor,60 there is little room for debate on the issue
of whether marriage bans harm children. This Court
noted the inevitable psychic harm imposed by the
Defense of Marriage Act (“DOMA”):
The differentiation [between same-sex and
opposite-sex couples] . . . humiliates tens of
thousands of children now being raised by
same-sex couples. The law in question makes
it even more difficult for the children to
understand the integrity and closeness of
their own family and its concord with other
60

133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013).
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families in their community and in their
daily lives.61
This Court further noted the financial injury the
federal marriage ban inflicted on children:
DOMA . . . brings financial harm to children
of same-sex couples. It raises the cost of
health care for families by taxing health benefits provided by employers to their workers’
same-sex spouses. And it denies or reduces
benefits allowed to families upon the loss of a
spouse and parent, benefits that are an integral part of family security.62
Marriage bans harm children because they:
(1) foreclose the central legal route to family forma63
tion; (2) categorically void existing legal parent-child

61

Id. at 2694.
Id. at 2695 (internal citation omitted).
63
Michigan, Ohio, Kentucky, and Tennessee deny same-sex
couples other avenues of legal parentage. MICH. COMP. LAWS.
ANN. § 710.24 (West 2014) (allowing joint adoption by married
couples); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3107.03 (West 2014) (allowing
adoption only by unmarried adult, or, jointly by husband and
wife); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 199.470 (West 2014) (allowing
adoption only by unmarried adult, or, jointly by husband and
wife). Even if they offered other avenues, the existence of alternative forms of legal parentage does not mitigate the claim that
precluding formation of the parent-child relationship through
marriage deprives children of one of the most protected forms
of parentage – parentage incident to an existing marriage. See
Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 124-27 (1989). For a
detailed description of the limits of alternative parentage see
Tanya Washington, In Windsor’s Wake: Section 2 of DOMA’s
(Continued on following page)
62
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relationships created incident to out-of-state marriages;64
(3) deny children of same-sex couples economic rights
and benefits and other legal protections;65 and (4) in66
flict psychological and stigmatic harm.
Defense of Marriage at the Expense of Children, 48 IND. L. REV.
1, 16-26 (2014).
64
Henry v. Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1052 (S.D. Ohio
2014) (describing the discriminatory impact of Ohio’s nonrecognition law the court observed, “Under Ohio law, if the
[Plaintiffs’] marriages were accorded respect, both spouses in
the couple would be entitled to recognition as the parents of
their expected children. As a matter of statute, Ohio respects the
parental status of the non-biologically related parent whose
spouse uses AI to conceive a child born to the married couple. . . .
However, Defendants refuse to recognize these Plaintiffs’ marriages and the parental presumptions that flow from them, and
will refuse to issue birth certificates identifying both women in
these couples as parents of their expected children.”).
65
See De Leon v. Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 653 (W.D. Tex.
2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 553 (W.D. Ky.
2014); Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 979-80 (S.D.
Ohio 2013).
66
For further explanation of the harms to children, see
Lewis A. Silverman, Suffer the Little Children: Justifying SameSex Marriage from the Perspective of a Child of the Union, 102
W. VA. L. REV. 411, 412 (1999) (“The preponderance of the dialogue about same-sex marriage concentrates on the adult partners and their derivative benefits from the relationship; precious
little focus is given to the rights of a child who may be a product
of a same-sex relationship.”); Nancy D. Polikoff, For the Sake of
All Children: Opponents and Supporters of Same-Sex Marriage
Both Miss the Mark, 8 N.Y. CITY L. REV. 573, 586 (2005); Courtney
G. Joslin, Searching for Harm: Same-Sex Marriage and the WellBeing of Children, 46 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 81, 85-89 (2011);
Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex
Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. 1589, 1595-1608 (2013).
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1. Family Formation
In most jurisdictions, both parties to a heterosexual marriage are presumed to be the legal parent
of children born into the marriage.67 This marital
presumption of parentage protects children born into
opposite-sex marriages by establishing filial relationships with both parents, even if children are not biologically related to both parents.68 The permanency,
consistency and stability inherent in the parent-child
relationship has been recognized by the states as securing children’s best interests in the adoption, custody, and visitation contexts.69

67

Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-27 (describing the utility and
history of the marital parentage presumption). See also OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03(A)(1) (West 2014) (providing Ohio’s
codification of the marital parentage presumption); KY. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 406.011 (West 2014) (providing Kentucky’s codification of the marital parentage presumption); Family Independence Agency v. Jefferson, 677 N.W.2d 800, 806 (Mich. 2004) (“The
presumption that children born or conceived during a marriage
are the issue of that marriage is deeply rooted in our statutes
and case law.”).
68
Michael H., 491 U.S. at 124-27.
69
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-6-401 (West 2014); Armbrister v.
Armbrister, 414 S.W.3d 685, 694-95 (Tenn. 2013); Irvin v. Irvin,
No. M2011-02424-COA-R3CV, 2012 WL 5993756, at *14, n.9
(Tenn. Ct. App. Nov. 30, 2012); Vibbert v. Vibbert, 144 S.W.3d
292, 295 (Ky. Ct. App. 2004) (“We now hold that the appropriate
test . . . is that the courts must consider a broad array of factors
in determining whether the visitation is in the child’s best interest. . . .”); Still v. Hayman, 794 N.E.2d 751, 755-56 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003) (“A strong public policy exists that it is in the child’s
interest that a parent-child relationship be formed. Moreover,
(Continued on following page)
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While biology provides one of the easiest guarantees of parentage and is often available to at least one
parent in same-sex couples, same-sex marriage bans
preclude the marital parentage presumption from
establishing a filial relationship between children and
70
their non-biological same-sex parents. Even more
public policy dictates that a parent is responsible to provide for
the health, maintenance, welfare, and well-being of his child. In
accordance with these public policies, it can be concluded that
Ohio favors the establishment of a parent-child relationship
when it is possible.” (internal citations omitted)); In re Spalding,
No. 320379, 2014 WL 4628885, at *2 (Mich. Ct. App. Sept. 16,
2014) (“In deciding whether termination is in the child’s best interests, the court may consider the child’s bond to the parent,
the parent’s parenting ability, the child’s need for permanency,
stability, and finality, and the advantages of a foster home over
the parent’s home.” (internal quotation marks omitted)); In re
C.K.G., 173 S.W.3d 714, 732 (Tenn. 2005) (“The paramount consideration in child custody cases is the child’s best interests. In
disputes between legal parents, we determine a child’s best interests in light of the comparative fitness of the parents and
must take into consideration . . . [t]he stability of the family
unit of the parents.” (internal citations omitted)); Cummings v.
Cummings, No. M2003-00086-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 2346000, at
*5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 15, 2004) (noting that “the welfare and
best interests of the child are the paramount concern in custody,
visitation, and residential placement determinations,” and “a
parenting arrangement that best maintains a child’s emotional
growth, health and stability, and physical care” is an important
factor in serving the best interests of the child).
70
The District Court in DeBoer credited the plaintiffs’ expert testimony regarding the adverse impact of marriage bans
on children in same-sex families and observed, “children being
raised by same-sex couples have only one legal parent and are
at risk of being placed in ‘legal limbo’ if that parent dies or is
incapacitated. Denying same-sex couples the ability to marry
therefore has a manifestly harmful and destabilizing effect on
(Continued on following page)
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harmful to children’s best interests are nonrecognition laws, which categorically negate existing
filial relationships between children and their nonbiological same-sex parents because these laws refuse
to recognize their parents’ legal out-of-state same-sex
71
marriages. The effect of exclusionary marriage laws
is to render these children legal strangers to one of
their parents in direct contravention of their best
interests.72
Notwithstanding states’ characterization of marriage bans and non-recognition laws as child protective measures, these laws harm the children they
purport to protect.73 Children in same-sex families are
deprived of the permanency, consistency, and stability
inherent in the parent-child relationship, which has
been recognized as securing children’s best interests
in the adoption and custody contexts.

such couples’ children.” DeBoer v. Snyder, 973 F. Supp. 2d 757,
764 (E.D. Mich. 2014).
71
Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1054; Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at
553.
72
As one judge observed, while questioning the constitutionality of depriving children of the opportunity to have de facto
parents recognized as legal parents, “[a law] that would deny
children . . . the opportunity of having their two de facto parents
become their legal parents, based solely on their biological
mother’s sexual orientation or marital status, would not only be
unjust under the circumstances, but also might raise constitutional concerns in light of . . . the best interests of the child.” In
re Jacob, 660 N.E.2d 397, 405 (N.Y. 1995) (citation omitted).
73
DeBoer, 973 F. Supp. 2d at 771.
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Since this Court’s decision in United States v.
Windsor, state and federal courts have acknowledged
states’ legitimate and compelling interests in promoting children’s welfare and well-being.74 However,
74

Bourke, 996 F. Supp. 2d at 553 (“The Court fails to see
how having a family could conceivably harm children. Indeed,
Justice Kennedy explained that it was the government’s failure
to recognize same-sex marriages that harmed children, not having married parents who happened to be of the same sex. . . .
[T]he Court cannot conceive of any reasons for enacting the laws
challenged here. Even if one were to conclude that Kentucky’s
laws do not show animus, they cannot withstand traditional
rational basis review.”); Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1056 (“[C]hild
welfare concerns weigh exclusively in favor of recognizing the
marital rights of same-sex couples.”); Latta v. Otter, 771 F.3d
456, 476 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Defendants’ essential contention is
that bans on same-sex marriage promote the welfare of children,
by encouraging good parenting in stable opposite-sex families. . . . Defendants have presented no evidence of any such
effect.”); Bostic v. Schaefer, 760 F.3d 352, 384 (4th Cir. 2014)
(“Because the Proponents’ arguments are based on overbroad
generalizations about same-sex parents, and because there is no
link between banning same-sex marriage and promoting optimal
childrearing, this aim cannot support the Virginia Marriage
Laws.”); Bostic v. Rainey, 970 F. Supp. 2d 456, 478-80 (E.D. Va.
2014) (“Of course the welfare of our children is a legitimate state
interest. However, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails
to further this interest. . . . [N]eedlessly stigmatizing and humiliating children who are being raised by the loving couples
targeted by Virginia’s Marriage Laws betrays that interest. . . .
The ‘for the children rationale’ rests upon an unconstitutional,
hurtful and unfounded presumption that same-sex couples cannot
be good parents. . . . The state’s compelling interests in protecting
and supporting our children are not furthered by a prohibition
against same-sex marriage.”); Kitchen v. Herbert, 961 F. Supp. 2d
1181, 1212 (D. Utah 2014) (“[T]he State fails to demonstrate any
rational link between its prohibition of same-sex marriage and
(Continued on following page)
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many courts, in full view of the harmful impact of
these laws on children in same-sex families, have
determined such laws fail even rational basis review
because they hinder rather than advance child welfare. The District Court in Himes explained:
Ohio refuses to give legal recognition to both
parents of these children, based on the
State’s disapproval of their same-sex relationships. . . . The children in Plaintiffs’
and other same-sex married couples’ families cannot be denied the right to two legal

its goal of having more children raised in the family structure
the State wishes to promote. . . . [T]he State’s prohibition of
same-sex marriage detracts from the State’s goal of promoting
optimal environments for children. The State does not contest
the Plaintiff ’s assertion that roughly 3,000 children are currently being raised by same-sex couples in Utah. These children are
also worthy of the State’s protection, yet Amendment 3 harms
them for the same reasons that the Supreme Court found that
DOMA harmed the children of same-sex couples.” (internal
citation omitted)); De Leon, 975 F. Supp. 2d at 653 (“There is no
doubt that the welfare of children is a legitimate state interest;
however, limiting marriage to opposite-sex couples fails to
further this interest. Instead, Section 32 causes needless
stigmatization and humiliation for children being raised by the
loving same-sex couples being targeted. . . . Defendants have not
provided any evidentiary support for their assertion that
denying marriage to same-sex couples positively affects childrearing. Accordingly, this Court agrees with other district
courts that have recently reviewed this issue and concludes that
there is no rational connection between Defendants’ assertion
and the legitimate interest of successful childrearing.”).
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parents . . . without a sufficient justification.
No such justification exists.75
The states contend that it is best for a child to
have a relationship to two married parents. If this
is true, then excluding families headed by same-sex
couples from marriage thwarts this goal.
2. Economic Harm
State marriage bans harm the economic wellbeing of the children of same-sex couples even more
extensively than the economic impact of DOMA described in Windsor. Similar to the laws that discriminated against non-marital children, state marriage
bans deny children of same-sex couples countless
rights and benefits that would otherwise flow from a
legal relationship with their non-biological parent.
These benefits are designed as a safety net to protect
children in the event of parental loss or other life
events, including workers’ compensation benefits,
state health insurance, civil service benefits, social
security benefits, inheritance, and wrongful death
76
proceeds. The lack of a legal relationship between
75

Henry, 14 F. Supp. 3d at 1054-55.
For a list of benefits, see Catherine Smith, Equal Protection for Children of Same-Sex Parents, 90 WASH. U. L. REV.
1589, 1603-07 (2013); Sam Castic, The Irrationality of a Rational Basis: Denying Benefits to the Children of Same-Sex Couples,
3 MOD. AM. 3, 4-6 (2007); Jennifer L. Rosato, Children of SameSex Parents Deserve the Security Blanket of the Parentage
Presumption, 44 FAM. CT. REV. 74, 75-76 (2006).
76
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the child and her non-biological same-sex parent (as
well as the parents’ lack of a legally recognized relationship to one another) also places the child at risk
in the event that her parents separate or divorce. The
child may be precluded from recovering child support
77
or the benefits of a settled custody arrangement.
The denial of these benefits is not simply a onetime injury; rather, the exclusion over the course of a
child’s lifetime is compounding and cumulative, and it
disrupts one of the primary functions of marriage – to
provide stability, financial and otherwise, for future
generations.78
3. Psychological Harm
In addition to harms to family formation and
economic interests, same-sex marriage bans also inflict psychological harm by symbolically expressing
the inferiority of families headed by same-sex couples
and the children in those families. This Court has

77

See Smith, 90 WASH. U. L. REV. at 1604-05.
It is important to recognize that contrary to stereotypes,
LGBT people raising children may face economic disadvantage.
Single LGBTs with children are three times more likely than
non-LGBTs to live near the poverty level, while same-sex
couples with children are twice as likely as comparable oppositesex couples to live near the poverty level. Gary J. Gates, The
Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, LGBT Parenting in the
United States, at 1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.law.ucla.
edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf (last visited March
2, 2015).
78
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previously considered stigma to children as relevant
in its assessment of the constitutionality of state
action. Highlighting the adverse psychological effects
of de jure segregation on black children, for example,
a unanimous Court announced in Brown v. Board of
79
Education:
To separate them from others of similar age
and qualifications solely because of their race
generates a feeling of inferiority as to their
status in the community that may affect
their hearts and minds in a way unlikely
ever to be undone. . . . Segregation of white
and colored children in public schools has a
detrimental effect upon the colored children.
The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law, for the policy of separating
the races is usually interpreted as denoting
the inferiority of the negro group.80
This Court has also acknowledged psychic harm to
undocumented children For example, in Plyler v.
81
Doe, discussed above, this Court described the effect
of the law as levying an “inestimable toll . . . on
the social[,] economic, intellectual, and psychological
well-being of the individual.”82 The Court went on to
emphasize the relevance of the law’s harmful impact
on children, stating:
79
80
81
82

347 U.S. 483.
Id. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).
457 U.S. 202 (1982).
Id. at 222.
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Section 21.031 imposes a lifetime hardship
on a discrete class of children not accountable for their disabling status. The stigma of
illiteracy will mark them for the rest of their
lives. . . . In determining the rationality of
§ 21.031, we may appropriately take into account its costs to the Nation and to the innocent children who are its victims.83
The states’ characterization of marriage bans as
child-protective measures that promote “responsible
procreation and optimal child-rearing” is at odds with
the adverse impact of the legislation on all children
with gay or lesbian parents. The effect of these bans
is to stigmatize the families of which these children
are a part, and, by extension, to stigmatize these
84
children.

83

Id. at 223-24.
Aff. of Gregory M. Herek, Ph.D. at ¶¶ 29, 30, Mass. v.
U.S. Dept. of Health and Human Services, 682 F.3d 1 (1st Cir.
2012) (No. 1:09-cv-11126-JLT), 2010 WL 604593 (“Denying . . .
recognition to married same-sex couples devalues and delegitimizes their relationships. It conveys the government’s judgment
that committed intimate relationships between people of the
same sex . . . are inferior to heterosexual relationships, and that
the participants in a same-sex relationship are less deserving of
society’s recognition than heterosexual couples. . . . To the extent
that laws differentiate majority and minority groups and accord
them differing statuses, they highlight the perceived ‘differentness’ of the minority and thereby promote and perpetuate
stigma.”) (“Stigma refers to an enduring condition, status, or
attribute that is negatively valued by society . . . and that
consequently disadvantages and disempowers those who have
it.”).
84
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Children of same-sex couples, like the victims of
racial segregation and immigrant children excluded
from educational opportunities, suffer the harmful
psychological effects of the condemnation of their
families, which, as the Court noted in Brown, is com85
pounded by the law’s sanction of this discrimination.
Significantly, this Court in Windsor acknowledged the stigmatic harm DOMA inflicted on children
and explained:
[I]t humiliates tens of thousands of children
now being raised by same-sex couples. The
law in question makes it even more difficult
for the children to understand the integrity
and closeness of their own family and its
concord with other families in their community and in their daily lives . . . DOMA instructs all federal officials, and indeed all
persons with whom same-sex couples interact, including their own children, that their
marriage is less worthy than the marriages
of others.86
State law, as the loci of family law, inflicts an
even greater psychological and stigmatic harm than
85

It is important to note that many children are at the
intersections of these categories. Half of the children under 18
who live with same-sex couples are children of color. Gary J.
Gates, The Williams Institute, UCLA School of Law, LGBT Parenting in the United States, at 1 (Feb. 2013), http://williamsinstitute.
law.ucla.edu/wp-content/uploads/LGBT-Parenting.pdf (last visited
March 2, 2015).
86
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2694-96.
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DOMA on the children with gay and lesbian parents.
Brown, Plyler and Windsor make it clear that the
stigma a discriminatory law imposes – particularly
on children – is a worthy consideration when analyzing the constitutionality of that law. The marriage
bans send a direct message to children of gay and
lesbian parents that their families are inferior and
less worthy of legal recognition.
B. The States’ Justifications for Imposing
these Discriminatory Harms are Patently
Impermissible
As demonstrated above, this Court’s precedent
establishes that states may not punish children for
matters beyond their control. Matters beyond the
child’s control include moral disapproval of adult
conduct, efforts to control or incentivize adult behavior, or practices that give effect to private bias. State
marriage bans do precisely this.
The justifications offered by the states in defense
of their respective marriage bans fall squarely within
this prohibited category of government action. In arguing before the Sixth Circuit, the various states
involved in this case presented a limited number of
justifications for their marriage bans. Several of
the states advance the “responsible procreation argument,” which contends that state marriage bans
“[e]ncourage[ ] opposite-sex couples to enter into a
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permanent, exclusive relationship within which to
have and raise children”87 or “encourage . . . sexual
interactions [between a man and a woman] to occur
in long-term, committed relationships, so that the
resulting children will be raised by both their mom
88
and their dad.” This is a naked attempt to incentivize adult behavior at the cost of children’s welfare,
and is not permitted under the body of law discussed
above.
The states further contend that the marriage
bans reflect a belief “that children benefit from being
raised by both a mother and a father” because “[m]en
and women are different, and having both a man and
a woman as part of the parenting team could reasonably be thought to be a good idea.”89 This justification
reflects a bare preference for certain families over
others, bias against same-sex couples and gender
stereotyping. Similarly, the contention that states
87

Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 37, DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at
*38.
88
Brief for Defendants-Appellants at 63, DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014) (No. 14-1341), 2014 WL 1998573, at
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may “promote marriage in the setting where children
naturally (biologically) come from – the union of a
man and a woman”90 seeks to enforce a bare preference for so-called “biological” families.
Thus, the states concede that their marriage
bans represent an effort to incentivize adult behavior
(“encouraging” adults in opposite-sex couples to enter
the institution of marriage and to procreate only
within that institution) as well as a bare preference
for families headed by opposite-sex couples and/or
families formed “biologically” or “naturally.” Even if
these were legitimate state interests standing alone,
they are – per precedent and fundamental notions of
fairness – impermissible bases for imposing harms on
the children of same-sex couples. Further, it does not
take much imagination to see that the preference for
families headed by opposite-sex couples sounds in
private bias against and moral disapproval of samesex couples.
As demonstrated above, none of these justifications is a permissible basis for imposing discriminatory harms on children.
------------------------------------------------------------------
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CONCLUSION
The judgment of the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals should be reversed.
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